This paper studies residential mortgage loss given default using a large set of historical loan-level default and recovery data of high loan-to-value mortgages from several private mortgage insurance companies. We show that loss given default can largely be explained by various characteristics associated with the loan, the underlying property, and the default, foreclosure, and settlement process. We find that the current loan-to-value ratio is the single most important determinant. More importantly, mortgage loss severity in distressed housing markets is significantly higher than under normal housing market conditions. Our empirical results have important policy implications for risk-based capital.
Introduction
Under the new Basel II capital framework, 1 the calculation of minimum regulatory capital under the advanced internal rating-based (A-IRB) approach requires accurate estimation of parameters that determine the credit risk of banks' financial asset portfolios: probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), and exposure at default (EAD). 2 While there has been a growing body of research relevant to the modeling and estimation of PD, there are few studies on
LGD (or loss severity, which is equal to 1-the recovery rate) to date, but the number has been increasing rapidly.
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The growing literature on LGD has covered several areas, including defining and measuring LGD and the correlation between PD and LGD, both theoretically and empirically.
The existing literature has also studied various factors that affect LGD. These include: (1) contract characteristics-seniority and security, credit facility type (loan, bond), term or revolving facility, covenant protection, collateral (type, appraisal date, and results); (2) borrower characteristics-profit margin, debt cushion, leverage; (3) differences across industry and industry conditions; and (4) macroeconomic systematic risk factors. Cyclical effects on LGD are also examined, and LGD during economic downturn periods has been compared to LGD under normal economic conditions. Lastly, research has been carried out to investigate the statistical distribution of LGD. Altman et al. (2005a) provide a comprehensive survey of literature on default recovery rates for corporate credit risk. Altman et al. (2005b) contain a collection of papers on recovery risk. Qi (2005) surveys research on LGD in stressed market conditions. However, the vast majority of these LGD studies are on wholesale exposures, such as corporate bonds and loans. Partly because of the unavailability of public data, very few studies have been done on retail exposures. Clauretie and Herzog (1990) study the effect of state foreclosure laws (judicial procedure, statutory right of redemption, and deficiency judgment) on loan losses for mortgages insured privately (i.e., private mortgage insurance (PMI)) and by government (e.g., Federal Housing Administration (FHA)). They find that judicial procedure and statutory right of redemption extend the foreclosure and liquidation processes and thus are associated with larger loan losses. They also show that deficiency judgment reduces loss severity for PMI that has no incentive conflict due to its coinsurance feature, while deficiency judgment has no significant impact on the recovery rate for FHA insurance, with which incentive conflict arises due to the lack of a coinsurance arrangement. Lekkas et al. (1993) empirically test the frictionless form of the options-based mortgage default theory. They find that higher initial loanto-value (LTV) ratios, regions with higher default rates (Texas), and younger loans are associated with significantly higher loss severities whereas the difference between contract and current interest rates has no impact on loss severities; consequently, they reject the propositions about loss severity implied by the frictionless form of the options-based mortgage default theory. Crawford and Rosenblatt (1995) extend options-based mortgage default theory to include transaction costs and show theoretically and empirically the effect of frictions on the individual strike price that affects loss severity.
The regression analysis in the above three studies can explain only a small portion of the total variations in loan-level mortgage LGD ( 2 R ranges from 0.02 to 0.14). 4 More recently, Pennington-Cross (2003) and Calem and LaCour-Little (2004) study determinants of mortgage 4 The adjusted of 0.56 to 0.57 reported in Clauretie and Herzog (1990) is from regressions at the state level, not at the loan level.
2 R loss severity based on government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) data, and their regression analysis shows improved explanatory power. The 2 R reported in Calem and LaCour-Little is 0.25, whereas it is 0.95 to 0.96 in Pennington-Cross (2003) . Although the latter study reports very high 2 R , it uses a much smaller sample and covers a shorter sample period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) ) that contains no serious housing market depreciation. 5 Coupled with the problems in LGD definition and the timing of the current loan-to-value (CLTV) calculation, the findings of Pennington-Cross (2003) should be interpreted with caution.
Overall the existing studies have found that CLTV or LTV are strongly related to recovery rates (Calem and LaCour-Little, 2004; Pennington-Cross, 2003; Lekkas et al., 1993; Clauretie and Herzog, 1990) . The age and size of the loan have also been shown to affect mortgage recovery rates (Calem and LaCour-Little, 2004; Pennington-Cross, 2003; Lekkas et al., 1993) . In addition, recovery rates are found to vary with state foreclosure laws (PenningtonCross, 2003; Clauretie and Herzog, 1990) , prime or subprime mortgages (Pennington-Cross, 2003) , and the relative median income (Calem and LaCour-Little, 2004) . These studies are summarized in Appendix 1.
The existing residential mortgage LGD studies, however, have not paid sufficient attention to how LGD would change under housing market downturn conditions, partly because of the lack of reliable mortgage loss data through a complete housing market cycle. The only study we are aware of that quantifies the expected and economic downturn LGD relationship is Calem (2003 In this paper, we study residential mortgage loss given default using a large set of historical loan-level default and recovery data of high-LTV mortgages from several private mortgage insurance companies. We show that LGD can be largely explained by various characteristics associated with the loan, the underlying property, as well as the default, foreclosure, and settlement process. As expected, CLTV is the single most important determinant.
More importantly, mortgage loss severity in distressed housing markets is significantly higher than under normal housing market conditions.
Our study differs from the existing mortgage loss severity studies in several important ways. First, compared to the existing studies on mortgage loss given default, our LGD definition is more comprehensive and closer to the Basel II definition. Besides the unpaid balance and the The rest of the paper is organized as the follows. In section 2, we describe in greater detail the mortgage claim data set that is used in this research. In section 3, we compare average mortgage loss severity across time, geographic regions, and CLTV ranges. Results of regression analysis are reported in section 4. Section 5 addresses the implications of our findings on riskbased capital. Conclusions are provided in section 6.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use a large and geographically diverse individual loan-level mortgage default and recovery data set from several major private mortgage insurance companies. whether the owner intended to occupy or invest at time of origination, and it includes the original property value and details abut the default (month and year, unpaid principal balance at default, and broker's opinion of property value at default). Further, the data include information about the foreclosure (month and year, whether the property was sold prior to foreclosure, salvage value net of sales costs and repairs 10 ) and the settlement date (month and year).
The following descriptive statistics are generated from the entire 241,293 mortgage insurance claims in the data set. The average original loan amount is about $109,000, and the average unpaid balance at default is around $106,000. The average original property value (the lesser of purchase price or appraised value) is $124,000, and the net salvage value accounts for, on average, about 73 percent of the original property value. The broker's opinion of property values at default averages about $100,000.
About 78 percent of the loans in the sample are for purchase and 9 percent for refinance. Columbia, California has the most mortgage insurance claims, representing 22.5 percent of all claims.
The raw data, compiled by MICA from its member companies, contain many errors and missing values, such as negative loan amount, invalid settlement date, etc. With assistance from MICA experts, the data were cleaned and scrubbed, resulting in 106,891 clean observations that are used for the analysis contained in the rest of this paper. Data exclusion criteria are listed in Appendix 3, and descriptive statistics from the cleaned data are provided in Table 3 .
Mortgage Loss Severity by Period, Region, and CLTV
The mortgage risk factors of LTV and CLTV are calculated as original loan amount divided by property value at origination and unpaid balance at default divided by property value at default, respectively. We define loss given default (LGD) as 11 100
CUPB ACRINT FCLEXP PROEXP NETREC LGD CUPB
where CUPB is unpaid balance at default; ACRINT is the interest accrued on CUPB for 3 months at a monthly average of the 30-year fixed conventional commitment rates based on the Freddie Mac weekly survey; FCLEXP is foreclosure expense (legal and courts) and is assumed to be 5 percent of the CUPB; property maintenance expenses (PROEXP) is assumed to be 3 percent of net recovery (NETREC), where NETREC = min(NETSALVAGE, 1.5*ORIGVAL) where NETSALVAGE and ORIGVAL are the salvage value net of sales costs and repairs and original 11 The loss severity defined in Equation (1) is before Mortgage Insurance (MI) claim. The mortgage insurance companies have the option of either paying the maximum percentage of the claim amount or paying the claim in full and taking title to the property. If the MI company exercises the option to pay the claim in full, the loss to the investor after MI is the small difference between total loss and MI claim amount.
property value, respectively. 12 All cash flows are discounted at the 1-year LIBOR from the foreclosure date to the time of default.
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We use the repeat-sales house price index (HPI) reported by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise and Oversight (OFHEO) as a proxy for the housing market conditions. (Table 1) . Given the periods of housing market downturns shown in Figure 1 and the high average claim rate from Table 1 , the period of 1990-1994 is considered as our economic downturn period. 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 than the mean LGD of 16 percent in the whole country during the same 1990-1994 period. This is consistent with the notion that loss severity should vary with the housing market condition in a particular region and during a specific time period. Table 2 also shows the loss severity seems to vary with the CLTV. For the same region and during the same period, higher mean loss severity is often observed with a higher CLTV. This is also consistent with the theoretical and empirical results documented in the existing literature. type, loan purpose, and whether the property was sold prior to foreclosure, etc. In the next section, we study the impact of these and other determinants of mortgage loss severity in a multiple regression framework. 
Determinants of Loss Given Default
Descriptive statistics of the key variables from the cleaned data are provided in Table 3 (variable definitions are given in Appendix 2). In Table 3 , LGD shows considerable amount of variation ranging from -37.3 percent to 84.8 percent, with a mean of 24.6 percent and standard deviation of 16.0 percent. CLTV also varies wildly from 38.8 percent to 170.9 percent with an average of 104.4 percent. The average initial LTV is 90.1 percent, and only 11 percent of the loans have an LTV below 80 percent. These percentages are expected from private mortgage insurance data. More than half (51.7 percent) of the defaulted mortgages in our sample have a CLTV greater than 100 percent. This is consistent with the "ruthless" default explanation from the options-based mortgage default theory, which considers default as an optimal decision of rational consumers. Crawford and Rosenblatt (1995) find that when transaction costs are considered, the rational borrower will default only when the value of the collateral falls below the mortgage value by an amount equal to the net transaction costs, such as the costs of moving, brokerage fees, taxes, future deficiency payments, and the stigma associated with default. Since net transaction costs are positive for most borrowers, if the current mortgage balance is close to the market value of the mortgage, the CLTV is expected to be well above 100 percent by the time the rational borrower exercises the default option. Furthermore, Lekkas et al. (1993) show that even if the default option is in the money (i.e., the market value of the house is less than the present value of future mortgage payments), it may not be optimal to exercise the default option because the mortgage claim includes both the options to prepay and also to default at some subsequent date. Reputation costs reduce credit ratings and thus could increase future borrowing costs. This could also be because of the borrower's unrealistic optimism (or wishful thinking) regarding his or her ability to make monthly mortgage payments on time in the future. 17 Finally, our property value at default is obtained by adjusting the broker's opinion of the property value with the house price index (as described in the CLTV definition in Appendix 2). Since the house price indices might overestimate the rate of appreciation on defaulted properties, there may be a downward bias in our estimation of the property value at default, resulting in an upward bias in CLTV.
The CLTV of slightly less than half of the defaulted mortgages in our sample (after scrubbing) is less than or equal to 100 percent, and 23.6 percent and 7.4 percent have a CLTV 17 Wishful thinking and irrational consumer behavior is studied in Yang et al. (2007) and the reference therein. Why would anyone default on a mortgage if there were positive equity, i.e., the house value were greater than the current outstanding mortgage balance? In that case, the borrower might be better off selling the property and repaying the debt instead of defaulting. There are several possible explanations. First, selling a house can be a time-consuming and costly process as the transaction cost can easily account for 6 percent or more of the property value. Therefore, selling a home with a 95 percent loan to value ratio could actually result in 1 percent or more loss to the homeowner when a 6 percent transaction cost is factored in. In this case, the person might be better off defaulting and occupying the property "rent free" for a time period from default to foreclosure rather than selling the property and paying back the loan. Second, the broker's opinion of the property value (not the actual sales price) is used to calculate CLTV. It is often the case that the true value of defaulted property is considerably below the fair market value of similar properties in the same neighborhood. 19 An upward bias in the broker's opinion of the defaulted property, which is especially likely if the broker uses a house price index to arrive at his or her valuation, will result in underestimation of CLTV. Third, some of the defaults might be triggered by unexpected non-financial reasons, such as job loss, a significant change in health status, and change in family structure, especially divorce, etc. In these cases the default option is exercised even while it is not "in-the-money" (i.e., these defaults are called "trigger event"
defaults as opposed to "ruthless" defaults, see Ambrose et al., 1997 and Pennington-Cross, 2006 foreclosure sale can be anywhere from six weeks to eighteen months, during which borrowers enjoy additional benefit (occupying the property "rent free") beyond just the elimination of negative equity but also incur costs (increase the probability of the lender's use of default penalties and deficiency judgment against borrowers' other assets). These costs and benefits must also be weighted at the time of default in determining whether the ultimate put option is in the money (Ambrose et al., 1997) .
Also from Table 3 is around five years. About 18 percent of defaulted properties in the sample were foreclosed (settled) within two years, and 50 percent within four years.
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To get more insight into how the key variables are related, we report in Table 4 the correlation matrix for the following variables:
LGD, CLTV, LTV, HPR, loan size, and the number of months from origination to foreclosure (AGE) and from default to foreclosure (FCTIME). There is a very high positive correlation between LGD and CLTV (0.811), a modest negative correlation between LGD and HPR (-0.248), and a modest negative correlation between 20 Loan age is the number of months between the origination date and the foreclosure date (or the settlement date if the foreclosure date is missing). The foreclosure date is missing for around 15 percent of our sample. The average might have been driven up by some outliers, for example, the maximum span from origination to default (or foreclosure) is 290 months in our sample, and the standard deviation is close to 40 months.
CLTV and HPR (-0.183) as expected. Consistent with intuition, Table 4 also shows that initial loan amount is negatively correlated with LGD (-0.056) and with LTV (-0.082), LGD is positively related to the length of the foreclosure process (.099), and larger initial loan amount is associated with earlier default (-.099). There is little correlation (0.002) between CLTV and LTV, and it is statistically insignificant. This may initially look surprising, as one might think, other things being equal, mortgages with higher LTV should have higher CLTV, and thus they should be positively correlated. However, when one analyses the origination mortgage population, it is intuitive and well established that mortgages originated with high LTV are more likely to default.
Our sample consists of only defaulted mortgages, a subset of all mortgages originated. For this subpopulation CLTV is largely driven by house price movements after origination, thus it may have little correlation with the original LTV. 
Regression with CLTV
Loss severity can be statistically characterized by conditional means and variances, which are in turn contingent on housing market conditions and on loan and property characteristics. We specify a general regression equation relating loss given default to loan and property characteristics and housing market conditions as
it
LGD where is the loss given default of the ith defaulted mortgage measured at time of default t, calculated as in Equation (1) Our sample is very large and there are no obvious violations of the classic regression assumptions. Thus the model was estimated using ordinary least squares as in Clauretie and Herzog (1990) , Calem and LaCour-Little (2004) , and all other studies on mortgage loss severity.
The regression parameter estimates, corresponding p-values, and goodness of fit measures are shown in Table 5 . The model shows relatively high explanatory power ( 2 R = 0.662). The impact of the housing market condition is captured in the regression analysis by the explanatory variables of CLTV and economic downturn scenarios. Consistent with the existing studies, loss severity rates are significantly positively related to CLTV (Pennington-Cross, 2003; Calem and LaCour-Little, 2004) and are significantly higher in distressed housing markets (Clauretie and Herzog, 1990) . This is also consistent with economic intuition: loans with lower CLTV will have a higher equity value which leads to a higher recovery rate and hence lower loss severity, and vice versa. In principle, if the "true" CLTV could be observed at time of default without noise, and the actual timing and amount of foreclosure and property expenses were available, one might be able to explain close to 100 percent of the variations in LGD. The coefficient of the downturn indicator is positive (4.44) and significant, indicating that, other things being equal, loss severity will be 4.44 percentage points higher in distressed housing markets.
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Normalized loan size has a negative impact on loss severity rates. Finally, we find that the LGD is higher in states with a judicial foreclosure process and the statutory rights of redemption. These observations are largely in line with those found in the existing literature. Our results show that the LGD is lower in states where deficiency judgments are prohibited, contrary to what has been found in the existing literature. Based on the framework of Ambrose et al. (1997) , in states where deficiency judgment is prohibited, lenders are likely to try hard to shorten the delay between default and foreclosure to reduce the period of the "free rent" and thus the probability of default. 22 This could actually result in lower LGD.
Thus our results are consistent with the theoretical framework of Ambrose et al. (1997) . Another reason may be that deficiency judgments are rare even when they are permitted because defaulting homeowners are unlikely to have many assets aside from the home and they often protect themselves against deficiency judgments by filing for bankruptcy (Pence, 2006) .
Regression with LTV
The interagency Basel IA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPR) (2006) and Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) (2005) on risk-based capital guidelines suggest basing risk weights for residential mortgages on LTV ratios. This will make capital requirements sensitive to risk and will unlikely increase regulatory burden for banks since LTV data are readily available and are often used in the loan approval process and in managing mortgage portfolios. To further assess the relevance of LTV in determining loss severity, we drop the CLTV dummies from the previous regression and add in the LTV dummy variables. The regression parameter estimates and corresponding p-values are shown in Table 6 . In the event of default and foreclosure, the homeowner equity is a function of the initial LTV and the subsequent course of house prices, which vary by geographic region and time period. In particular, the loss severity will increase as the defaulted loan experiences a subsequent house price decline for the 12 to 18 months starting from delinquency. The theory is clearly demonstrated in the empirical estimates from Table 6 as loss severity increases by about 9.44 percentage points in the distressed housing markets where HPI shows decline from its level 18 months ago. The regression results also show that higher LTV at origination leads to higher loss severity at default. The impact of other explanatory variables largely follows the same pattern as observed in Table 5 . However, the estimates reported in Table 6 may be biased since the model suffers from omitted variable problem as CLTV, an important explanatory variable, was not included. As a result, the coefficient to STRESS may have a positive bias since CLTV is positively correlated with LGD and STRESS.
Overall the following observations can be made from Tables 5 and 6 . First, the following factors-current loan-to-value ratio, stress factor, loan size, property type (single family, condo, etc.), loan purpose (purchase or refinance), whether the owner intended to occupy at origination, whether the property was sold prior to foreclosure, the age of the loan, and the state foreclosure laws-jointly can explain about 66 percent of the variation in the loss severity in the MICA data, which consist largely of high-LTV mortgages (average LTV around 90 percent). Second, CLTV is the single most important determinant of LGD-the higher the CLTV, the higher the LGD.
After substituting CLTV dummies with LTV dummies, the adjusted R 2 decreases dramatically from 66 percent to 7 percent. Third, LGD during housing market downturns is statistically significantly higher. The stress factor is especially important in the absence of CLTV; LGD is about 9.44 percentage points higher during economic downturn periods, partly because of the positive bias induced by omitting CLTV in the model. Fourth, CLTV is a much better predictor of LGD than LTV.
Implications for Risk-Based Capital Requirements
Our empirical results have important implications for risk-based capital requirements. In regions. In this section, we discuss these one by one.
Use LTV to segment risk
Our empirical results in Table 6 show that LTV is statistically and economically significantly related to LGD, and higher LTV is associated with higher LGD. Since regulatory capital is linearly related to LGD, our statistical results thus support the use of LTV to segment risk and the notion that the higher the LTV, the higher the risk weights. However, since our data do not allow for default probability nor expected loss modeling at the appropriate level of granularity, we cannot comment on the appropriateness of the risk weight numbers suggested in Table 3 of the U.S. Basel IA ANPR (2005) and Tables 2 and 3 
Whether LTV should be updated periodically
CLTV has a much higher correlation with LGD than with LTV (Table 4) , and not surprisingly, regression with CLTV has much better explanatory power than that without CLTV (Tables 5 and 6 ). Furthermore, the average LTV at origination is around 90 percent whereas at time of default, the average CLTV jumps up to 104 percent (Table 3) , reflecting a significant decrease in homeowner equity. Therefore, in our opinion, LTV should be updated periodically to better segment risk. However, to calculate CLTV, lenders need to update the property value periodically, which could be quite costly. Alternative approaches could be explored to get a more timely update on property values. For example, the lender could use automated valuation models (AVMs) through vendors or tax assessment, build internal models, or at least adjust the property value using a local house price index. All these alternatives bear some model risk, i.e., the updated property value might differ from the true market value of the property. When the difference is too big, CLTV might become inferior to LTV. Therefore, it is important for banks to follow validation standards on property valuation models (including vendor models) to ensure the model risk is in check.
Supervisory LGD mapping function
Paragraph 468 LGD mapping function,
, has been proposed to transform the longrun default-weighted average LGD to the economic downturn LGD to be used in the regulatory capital requirement formula for banks that are unable to develop acceptable internal downturn
LGD estimates. In this section, we examine the accuracy of this mapping function based on the MICA data.
Considering the mean loss severity of the entire sample period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) as ELGD, and the mean loss severity of the period 1990-1994 as the downturn LGD, we plot the downturn
LGD against ELGD from Table 2 LGDs against ELGDs by region (New England, Pacific, and National) and by CLTV buckets taken from Table 2 . We further examine the mapping function based on the regression analysis in section 4. Figure 3 plots the downturn LGD against ELGD based on the regression results in Table 5 for seven hypothetical mortgage defaults from seven different CLTV buckets, but with the same and the most typical values for the rest of explanatory variables-the loan size is between 0.8 and 1.1 times the median house price in the area, the loan is for a single-family house, the loan purpose is purchase, the owner intends to live in the property, there is no presale before foreclosure, and the loan age is between two and four years. As discussed in section 4. It should be noted, however, the model in Table 6 suffered from an omitted variable problem; thus, some of the model coefficients (e.g., STRESS) may be severely biased. Consequently, it is inappropriate to draw conclusions about the supervisory mapping function from this model.
10 percent supervisory LGD floor
In the U.S. Basel II NPR (2006) , there is a 10 percent supervisory LGD floor for residential mortgage exposures, except for those guaranteed by a sovereign entity such as FHA or VA. Before the private mortgage insurance claim benefit is factored in, our sample average
LGD is 24.6 percent. Loss severity is less than 7.5 percent for 16 percent of the defaults and is less than 12.5 percent for 27 percent of the 106,891 defaults.
The MICA data does not contain information on mortgage insurance claim benefit, but it can be reasonably well inferred based on common PMI coverage levels and claim handling practices. We assume the coverage level is 12 percent of the claimed losses on mortgages with LTV less than or equal to 85 percent, 25 percent on mortgages with LTV less than or equal to 90 percent, 30 percent on 95 percent, and 35 percent on 100 percent. The mortgage insurance companies have the option of either paying the maximum coverage percentage of the claim amount or paying the claim in full and taking the title to the property. If the mortgage insurance company exercises the option to pay the claim in full, the loss to the lender after factoring in the mortgage insurance benefit is close to zero.
After considering the private mortgage insurance payment calculated as above, the sample average LGD becomes 1.73 percent. Around 78 percent of the 106,891 mortgage defaults in our sample have an LGD that is less than 7.5 percent, and 85 percent of our sample have an
LGD less than 12.5 percent. Therefore, the 10 percent LGD supervisory floor is binding for more than 78 percent of the mortgage defaults in the MICA sample. Note, however, these statistics are based on our entire sample of mortgage claims. When applied to the downturn LGD of 9.59 percent (=8%+0.92*1.73%, based on the supervisory mapping function), the 10 percent floor becomes less binding.
Conclusions
Using a large set of historical loan-level default and recovery data of high-LTV mortgages from several private mortgage insurance companies, we find that the following factors-the current loan-to-value ratio, loan-to-value at origination, downturn factor (measured by a decline in house price index from a year and a half previously in the state where the property is located), loan size, property type (single family, condo, etc.), loan purpose (purchase or refinance), whether the owner intended to occupy at origination, whether the property was sold prior to foreclosure, the age of the loan, and the state foreclosure laws-jointly can explain most of the variations in the loss severity in our sample (adjusted 2 R of 0.662). We also find that CLTV is the single most important determinant of LGD-the higher the CLTV, the higher the
LGD. Substituting CLTV dummies with LTV dummies causes the adjusted 2 R to decrease dramatically from 66 percent to 7 percent. Loss severity in distressed housing markets is found to be statistically significantly higher. In the absence of CLTV, the omitted variable problem causes the stress factor appears to be especially large-LGD is about 9.44 percentage points higher under economic downturn conditions. Finally, LTV is positively related to LGD, but CLTV is a much better predictor of LGD than LTV.
The implications of our study on risk-based capital are the following: LTV at the time of loan origination can be used to segment risk; updated LTV (or CLTV) is the single most important predictor for residential mortgage LGD and thus should be used to segment risk if it is available. Furthermore, the proposed supervisory LGD mapping function appears to be somewhat conservative across geographic regions and current loan-to-value ratios of the exposures, based on both a default-weighted average approach and a regression analysis 
